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VAUGHN v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORA TION*:
LIMITING DEFECTIVE PRODUCT TORT
LOSS RECOVERY
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently resolved the issue of
whether a plaintiff can recover in tort for losses incurred from a
defective product where damage is limited to the product itself.' In
Vaughn v. General Motors Corp.,2 the court held that where a prod3
uct's defect causes damages through a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence, a plaintiff may recover under a tort theory of liability 4 for
* 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984).
1. Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984).
In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965),
Illinois adopted the doctrine of strict liability under Sec. 402A of the Restatement of Torts, which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Some jurisdictions have interpreted this section to exclude damage to the defective product itself. See
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
2. 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984).
3. The term "sudden and calamitous" originated in Fentress v. Van Etta
Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, Sabella
v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). In Fentress, the
court allowed a tort recovery for damages sustained to the plaintiff's auto in an
accident resulting from defective brakes. Id. The plaintiff's vehicle was the
only property damaged. Id. at 864, 323 P.2d at 228. The court limited recovery
in tort to situations where "some violence or collision with external objects"
existed. Id. at 866, 323 P.2d at 229. See Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 623 P.2d 324, 328 n.4 (Alaska 1981) (discussion of the "sudden and
calamitous" occurrence requirement).
The term "accident" is sometimes used to refer to a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 388, 306
S.E.2d 253, 257 (1983).
4. Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 466 N.E.2d 195, 197
(1984). The plaintiff brought the action against the manufacturer for both negligence and strict liability. Id. at 432-33, 466 N.E.2d at 195-96. Illinois does not
make a distinction, however, between negligence and strict liability when deciding whether a plaintiff may recover in tort for economic losses resulting from
damage to the defective product itself. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 86, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (1982) (distinction between economic
loss and property damage "applies whether the tort theory involved is strict
liability or negligence").
Economic loss has been held to be recoverable under the tort theory of
intentional misrepresentation. See Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d
282, 402 N.E.2d 599 (1980) (economic damages recoverable for fraudulent mis-
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all losses that result from the occurrence. This is true regardless of
whether there is concurrent personal injury or damage to property
other than the defective product.5 Prior controversy in Illinois
stemmed from the view that a court's allowance of a tort recovery
for damages of an economic nature would infringe on the legislature's decision to adopt the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 6 In an effort to avoid such an infringement, the
Vaughn court made a distinction beween property damage recoverable in tort 7 and economic losses8 recoverable under contract law. 9
In Vaughn, the plaintiff was involved in an accident when his
truck overturned as a result of brake failure.' 0 Although the plaintiff did not suffer personal injury, he did sustain various business
losses, including damage to the vehicle itself." Vaughn filed a suit
in tort against the truck manufacturer and dealer. 12 The trial court
dismissed the case holding that, where only the defective product is
representation). See also Bertschy, Negligent Performanceof Service Contracts
and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 249, 249 (1984) ("economic
loss is in fact recoverable under certain circumstances in tort"). The main focus
of this casenote, however, is on the doctrine of strict products liability.
5. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 436, 466 N.E.2d at 197.
6. The Illinois legislature adopted the sales provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1983). See infra
note 36 and accompanying text.
7. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. There are various definitions of the term "economic loss." The most
prevalent definition of economic loss is "damages for inadequate value, costs of
repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profitswithout any claim of personal injury or damage to other property." Bertschy,
The Economic Loss Doctrine in fllinois after Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J. 346, 348
(1983) (quoting Note, Econoic Loss and Products Liability Jurisprudence,66
COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966)).
9. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 466 N.E.2d at 197 (1984).
10. Id. at 432-33, 466 N.E.2d at 195. Vaughn first began experiencing brake
problems when the vehicle had only been driven 103 miles. Id. at 432, 466
N.E.2d at 195. The damage to the vehicle, however, did not occur until some
nineteen months after it had been purchased. Id. at 432-33, 466 N.E.2d at 195.
In the meantime, the plaintiff had had the brakes checked and worked on numerous times. Id. at 432, 466 N.E.2d at 195.
11. Id. at 433, 466 N.E.2d at 195. Plaintiff's prayer for relief was in the
amount of $43,966.25, which sum represented the loss of the truck, expenditures
for renting another truck, overtime, expenses incurred for brake repair prior to
the incident, repair costs of a bulk fuel tank attached to the truck at the time of
the overturn, and cleanup of spilled fuel. Id.
12. Id. at 432, 466 N.E.2d at 195. Count I of the plaintiff's complaint was for
strict products liability against General Motors, alleging that the vehicle was
defective when it left the manufacturer's possession and failed to perform when
used in the manner ordinarily expected. Id. Count II of the plaintiff's complaint alleged that General Motors negligently manufactured the truck. Id. at
433, 466 N.E.2d at 195.
In Illinois, the doctrine of strict liability applies to "manufacturers, sellers,
contractors, those who hold themselves out to be manufacturers, assemblers of
parts and suppliers and manufacturers of component parts." Sipari v. Villa
Olivia Country Club, 63 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992, 380 N.E.2d 819, 825 (1978).
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damaged, economic

losses resulting

from qualitative defects 13

should be recovered under a contract theory of recovery, rather
than under a tort theory. 14 The appellate court reversed the lower
court's judgment holding that, damage to the defective product itself is considered property damage and recoverable in tort if the
product is dangerous and if the damage results from a "sudden and
15
calamitous" occurrence.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court judgment.16 The issue before the court was whether a plaintiff has a
tort action when an unreasonably dangerous defect in a product
causes damage through a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence and
that damage is limited to the product itself. 17 The court agreed
with the appellate court's reasoning and held that where the damage to the product results from a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence, the plaintiff has suffered property damage recoverable in
tort, rather than purely economic losses for which there is no tort
8
recovery basis.'
In its analysis, the Vaughn court focused primarily on how the
damage to the truck occurred. Relying on its decision in Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,19 the court held that where the prod-

uct fails due to deterioration or causes not of an accidental nature,
resulting damages are treated as economic losses, recoverable under
13. A product is considered to have a qualitative defect when it is unfit for
its intended purpose. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
652 F.2d 1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1981).
14. Vaughn, 102 111. 2d at 435, 466 N.E.2d at 196. See Vaughn v. General
Motors Corp., No. 79-L-40 (C.C. Fulton Cty. 1981).
15. Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ill. App. 3d 201, 204, 454 N.E.2d
740, 742 (1983), affd, 102 Ill. 2d 431, 433, 466 N.E.2d 195, 196 (1984).
16. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 437, 466 N.E.2d at 198. Justice Goldenhersh delivered the opinion of the court. No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
17. Id. at 433-34, 466 N.E.2d at 196. The defendant also argued that since
Vaughn was aware of the defect in the brakes and continued to use the automobile for nineteen months, he should be barred from recovering. Id. at 434, 466
N.E.2d at 196. The court dismissed this argument as being relevant only to the
doctrines of assumption of risk and comparative fault, neither of which was at
issue before the court. Id. at 436-37, 466 N.E.2d at 197.
The court also rejected defendant's argument that manufacturers should
not bear the burden of passing the costs of defective products on to the purchasers of its products. Id. at 434, 466 N.E.2d at 196. Defendants argued instead, that
the purchasers should bargain with the manufacturer and retailer for warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, thereby insuring themselves against
potential liability resulting from defective products. Id. at 434, 466 N.E.2d at
197. The court found this reasoning to be contrary to the underlying policy of
strict products liability, as adopted in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
618-21, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965). See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
18. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 436, 466 N.E.2d at 197. The court found that
Vaughn's complaint stated a cause of action for strict liability. Id. The negligence count was not addressed. Id. See supra notes 4 and 12.
19. 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982). See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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a contract theory of liability.20 If the defective product, however,
causes damages that result from a sudden or dangerous occurrence,
they are considered property damage and are recoverable under a
21
tort theory.
The court cited its reasoning in Moorman for making such a
distinction. When a defective product causes physical injury to
property through a sudden and dangerous occurrence, the essence
of a product liability suit is present. 22 Recovery should be allowed
not because the plaintiff failed to receive the quality of product he
expected, but because the defective product has exposed the plain23
tiff to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or property.
Contract law, on the other hand, protects expectation interests and
provides the proper theory of recovery when a product contains a
qualitative defect which results in damages from a non-accidental
occurrence. 24 Because the brake failure in Vaughn caused the vehicle to suddenly overturn, Vaughn's losses were due to a "sudden
and calamitous" occurrence. 25 Therefore, the damage did not constitute solely economic loss, but was also property damage recover26
able in tort.
The court was correct in finding that the damage to the truck
itself was property damage and recoverable in tort.2 7 The court
wisely did not extend this theory to allow a tort recovery for solely
economic losses which result from the product's mere failure to
meet a buyer's expectations. 28 The court drew an arbitrary line of
distinction between property damage and economic loss, however,
when it required that the damage result from a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence. 29 The court should have made its distinction between property damage and economic loss by relying on a strict
products liability analysis of examining whether the truck was defective when it left the control of the manufacturer, and whether
the defect was unreasonably dangerous to Vaughn's person or
30
property.
There are two major theories of tort recovery for economic
damages in this country. A minority of jurisdictions allow a tort
20. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 466 N.E.2d at 197 (quoting Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 81-83, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (1982)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 436, 466 N.E.2d at 197.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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recovery of all losses where the product is proven to be defective,
regardless of whether the product is considered dangerous. 31 The
majority of jurisdictions, however, hold that the defective product
must be unreasonably dangerous to persons or property in order to
recover economic damages in tort. 32 Some of the courts that follow
31. This theory was first advanced by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). In Santor, the
plaintiff was allowed recovery in strict liability for defective carpeting that developed unusual lines. Id. The court held that a manufacturer is liable in tort
to a purchaser for injuries or damages sustained from a defective product, even
when the damage is only to the defective product itself. Id. at 60-61, 207 A.2d at
312. See also Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 44 Colo. App. 470, 663 P.2d
1041 (1983) (plaintiff allowed recovery in negligence for latent defects in new
home); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970) (plaintiff allowed recovery in strict liability for defective golf carts);
Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 647 P.2d 334 (Mont. 1982) (plaintiff allowed recovery in strict liability for a defective mobile home); Iacono v.
Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975) (plaintiff
allowed recovery for the negligent installation of a driveway); City of LaCrosse
v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976) (plaintiff
allowed recovery in strict liability for a defective roof). See generally
Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American
ProductsLiability, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1977) (manufacturers should
be liable for losses resulting from merely defective products); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding ProductEconomic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493, 499501 (1977) (rejection of the dangerous-non-dangerous distinction between economic loss and property damage); Comment, Applying the No-Privity Exception to Express Warranties-AnotherStep Toward Extending Strict Liability to
Recover Solely Economic Losses, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 243 (1983) (recovery in strict
liability should be allowed for harm resulting from defective products, regardless of dangerousness of product).
32. This position was first advanced by the Supreme Court of California in
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). In
Seely, the plaintiff was denied recovery in tort for lost profits and the purchase
price of a truck when the vehicle overturned due to defective brakes. Id. The
court rejected the adoption of strict liability as a legitimate theory to recover
economic losses, holding that the doctrine of strict liability was designed not to
undermine the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, but to
govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 21. The court found that, although the damage to the truck was
"property damage," recovery in strict liability was not warranted because the
plaintiff failed to prove that the product's defect caused the loss. Id. at 19, 403
P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. See also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (damage to a dangerously defective front-end loader considered property damage and recoverable in tort);
Largoza v. General Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (recovery in tort
allowed for dangerously defective refrigerator); Hardley Able Coal Co. v. International Harvester Co., 494 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (recovery in strict liability allowed for dangerously defective bulldozer which damaged itself);
Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983) (recovery in tort allowed for
damage to building resulting from toxic insulation); Rocky Mountain Fire and
Casualty Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 640 P.2d 851 (1982) (losses
recoverable in strict liability and negligence for unreasonably dangerous defective motor home); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E 2d
253 (1983) (tort recovery allowed for damage to defective drilling machine
which was found to be unreasonably dangerous to its user's person and/or property); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978)
(plaintiff denied recovery in negligence for defective tractor which was not
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the majority, however, require damage to property other than the
defective product itself.

33

As Vaughn demonstrated, Illinois now follows the view that
damage to the defective product itself may be recovered in tort
where the defect causes damages from a "sudden and calamitous"
occurrence. 34 Earlier decisions of Illinois' lower courts, however,
did not allow a tort recovery for economic damages absent personal
injury or damage to other property. 35 The basis for denying recovfound to be unreasonably dangerous); Mid-Hudson Mack, Inc. v. Dutchess
Quarry and Supply Co., 99 A.D.2d 751, 471 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1984) (recovery in tort
denied for defective truck); Cayuga Harvester, Inc., v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 95
A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983) (recovery in tort denied for damages resulting
from a defective harvesting machine); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture
Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (recovery in strict liability available for defective clock which caused a fire at plaintiff's place of business).
33. See Cooley v. Salopian Indus., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974) (doctrine
of strict liability does not apply to the defective product itself); Superwood
Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) (recovery in negligence or strict liability not allowed without concurring personal injury or damage to other property); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying
Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) (recovery in tort denied where a defectively
manufactured plane crashed, causing damage only to the plane itself). See also
Signal Oil and Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). In
Signal Oil, the plaintiff was allowed to recover in strict products liability
against a heater manufacturer, installer, and component part assembler for
damages caused by a defective reactor which resulted in an explosion and fire at
its refinery. Id. Recovery was allowed on the basis that the defective product
caused damage to other property. Id. at 325. But see Cline v. Prowler Indus. of
Maryland, 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980). A recovery in tort is not available where
the defective product causes property damage or personal injury. Cline, 418
A.2d at 974. An injured plaintiff must resort to recovery under the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which the court held, preempts the doctrine of
strict liability. Id. See generally Bland & Wattson, Property Damage Caused by
Defective Products: What Losses are Recoverable?, 9 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 1,
14-18 (1983) (general discussion of jurisdictions allowing tort recovery for damage to defective product itself); Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic"Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29 (1976) (damages solely to product itself should
not be recoverable in tort).
Some plaintiffs, in an effort to avoid the "damage to other property" requirement, have argued that the defective part of the product was a component
part which damaged other component parts of the product, thus resulting in
"damage to other property." Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel,
136 Ariz. 444, 447, 666 P.2d 544, 548-49 (1983). Most courts have rejected this
theory of recovery because of its potential for unfair and unlimited application.
Id. at 448, 666 P.2d at 549. See Northern Power and Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981). In Northern Power, the court rejected
the component part argument, reasoning that "[s]ince all but the very simplest
of machines have component parts, such a broad holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in virtually every case where a product damages itself." NorthernPower, 623 P.2d at 330. See generally Bertschy, supra note 8, at
352 (losses should be examined as a whole and recovery in tort denied or allowed as a whole).
34. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 436, 466 N.E.2d at 197.
35. In 1977, the Illinois appellate court held that economic losses were not
recoverable in tort. Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d
194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977). In Koplin, the plaintiff was denied recovery for dam-
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ery was a fear that tort law and contract law would become
36
indistinguishable.
The Illinois Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether economic losses alone are recoverable in tort in Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co. 37 In Moorman, the court recognized
the need to extend a tort theory of recovery to plaintiffs who incur
economic damages resulting from defective products that expose
the users to an unreasonable risk of injury to their property. 38 The
court denied recovery to the plaintiff for losses he sustained due to
a defective grain storage tank because it found, based on the manner in which the losses occurred, that the damages were a result of
the tank's deterioration. 39 The court did note, however, that the
line between tort law and contract law should be drawn using interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and
the manner in which the injury arose. 40 The Moorman court implied, but never expressly stated, that it would allow tort recovery
41
for damages to only the defective product itself.
ages resulting from defective air conditioning units. Id. at 194-95, 364 N.E.2d at
100-01. The court found that the case fell "within the narrow range of situations dividing tort theory from contract theory." Id. at 199, 364 N.E.2d at 103.
The court held that absent property damage or personal injury, purely economic losses were not recoverable under a tort theory of liability. Id. at 203, 364
N.E.2d at 107.
36. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280
(3d Cir. 1980). The court, predicting Illinois law, held that a seller of a defective
roof was not liable in tort for economic losses incurred by the buyer. Id. The
court defined "economic loss" as a loss resulting from the failure of the product
to meet the expectations of the buyer and seller. Id. at 288. The court feared
that holding a seller strictly liable for economic losses would conflict with the
Illinois legislature's decision to enact the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 289.
This fear that tort law and contract law would become indistinguishable in
the event that the courts allowed tort recovery for solely economic losses was
further demonstrated in Wuench v. Ford Motor Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 317, 432
N.E.2d 969 (1982) (tort recovery denied for losses resulting from defective axle
on automobile); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Burns Elec. Security Serv., 93
Ill. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1981) (tort recovery denied for losses resulting
from defective security system); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980) (tort recovery denied for losses resulting
from defective glue). In Fireman's Fund, however, the court stated that
"[e]conomic loss should be contrasted with loss which the parties could not reasonably be expected to have in mind such as hazards peripheral to what the
product's function is." Fireman'sFund, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 300, 417 N.E.2d at 133.
The court rejected Koplin's distinction between physical harm and economic
loss as the factor determining whether losses are recoverable in tort law. Id.
37. 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
38. Id. at 81, 435 N.E.2d at 448.
39. Id. at 85-86, 435 N.E.2d at 450. The storage tank developed a crack,
which caused the plaintiff to suffer losses representing repair costs and lost
profits due to the loss of use of the tank. Id. at 73-74, 435 N.E.2d at 444.
40. Id. at 85, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
41. See Bland & Wattson, supra note 33, at 10-11. Subsequent to Moorman,
the Illinois appellate court allowed recovery against a tank manufacturer for
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Denying tort recovery for damage to the defective product has
been criticized as being an arbitrary line of distinction between
property damage and economic loss. 42 The doctrine of strict liability for personal injury and property damage was based on the theory that the manufacturer, not the user or the consumer, should
43
bear the losses incurred from unreasonably dangerous products.
44
This policy puts the risk of loss on the party best able to bear it. It
also deters45 the manufacturer from producing defective products
economic damages resulting from the sudden and violent rupture of a tank. BiPetro Refining v. Hartness Painting, 120 Ill. App. 3d 556, 458 N.E.2d 209 (1983).
The court interpreted Moorman to allow recovery of economic damages where
the defective product fails to fulfill the expectation of the parties, if the failure
results in a sudden violent occurrence. Id. at 558-59, 458 N.E.2d at 212. The
court justified this decision on the basis that in Bi-Petro Refining there was a
risk of destruction as a result of the tank's rupture, whereas in Moorman, the
only risk was that the contents of the tank might slowly leak out. Id. at 560, 458
N.E.2d at 212. In another Illinois case, recovery of economic damages was denied when a defective storm and surface removal system caused a flood and
damages consisting of clean up and restoration of plaintiff's property. Palatine
Nat'l. Bank v. Charles W. Greengard Assocs., 119 Ill. App. 3d 376, 456 N.E.2d 635
(1983). The court held that the damages related to a "natural accumulation of
water on the premises and not to the 'type of sudden and dangerous occurrence
best served by policy of tort law.'" Id. at 380, 456 N.E.2d at 638-39 (quoting
Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 85, 435 N.E.2d at 450 (1982)).
42. Fordyce Concrete, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 118 (D. Kan.
1982) (damage to cab of truck resulting from a defective chassis recoverable in
tort); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544
(1983). In Arrow Leasing, the court examined other jurisdictions' attempts to
distinguish property damage from economic loss. Id. at 448, 666 P.2d at 547-49.
The court concluded that such distinctions should not be broadly applied. Id.
Instead, courts should examine each case "on its own facts bearing in mind the
purposes of tort law as contrasted with contract law." Id. at 448, 666 P.2d at 548.
See supra note 32 and cases cited therein.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). See also
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). "[T]he invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the
loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit are present. . . in cases
involving motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condition
makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user.
Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at
186.
44. See Comment, Manufacturers'Liabilityto Remote PurchasersFor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?,114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966). This
theory, sometimes referred to as the "enterprise theory of liability," was first
introduced by Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, who
stated:
[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19,
403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
45. See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to
and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 59 (1965) (a manufacturer's "complete defense" against a strict products liability suit is a "product free from defects"). See also Zammit, Manufacturers' Responsibility for Economic Loss
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unreasonably dangerous to their users. 46 These policies strongly
support the court's extension of tort recovery in Vaughn, where the
damage was limited to the defective truck. Imposing strict liability
for personal injury and property damage applies equally to situations where the unreasonably dangerous defective product damages
47
itself, thus causing the plaintiff to incur economic damages.
There is no reason to distinguish between the plaintiff's other property and the property which was damaged as a result of its own
defect 48 because the defective product is just as much property as is
his other property. 49 Therefore, the Vaughn court was correct in
finding that the plaintiff's losses, although limited to the defective
truck itself, were property damage and recoverable in tort.
The court wisely did not extend its holding and follow the minority jurisdictions' position of allowing a tort recovery for all losses
resulting from a defective product, regardless of whether the prodDamages in Products Liability Cases: What Result in New York?, 20 N.Y.L.F.
81, 84 (1974) (stating that "imposing liability on a manufacturer for the cost of
repair where a truck's brakes are discovered to be defective incidentally promotes the policy of deterring the production of trucks with unsafe
brakes ..
").
46. Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court questioned whether the
imposition of strict liability does in fact deter a manufacturer from producing
unsafe products:
A skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who is unmoved by the prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa loquitur,and by
the effect of any injury whatever upon the reputation of his goods, will
really be stimulated by the relatively slight increase in possible liability to
take additional precautions against defects which cannot be prevented by
only reasonable care.
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 23-24, 403 P.2d 145, 154-55, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 26-27 (1965) (Peters, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1119 (1960)).
47. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1173 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic Loss-The
Fine Line of DistinctionMade Clearer,27 VILL. L. REV. 483, 489 (1982) ("a product is no less defective if it injures only itself, and, accordingly, its manufacturer
is no less culpable under such circumstances.").
48. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp., 652 F.2d at 1172-73. The court stated
that "[t]ort law imposes a duty on manufacturers to produce safe items, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property,
or the product itself." Id.
49. See National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332
N.W.2d 39 (1983) (court reversed its prior holding that the doctrine of strict
liability could not be used to recover for damages to product itself); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 858 (W. Va. 1982) ("damage to
the defective product should be treated as is damage to other property"); Air
Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 219, 206 N.W.2d
414, 427 (1973) (damages sustained to electric motors as a result of the motor's
own defect states a cause of action in strict liability). See also O'Brien, Products
Liability: Should Illinois Allow Recovery for Property Damage Absent Personal Injury?, 1 N.I.U. L. REV. 57 (1981) (recovery in strict liability and negligence should be allowed for damage to product itself where product is
dangerously defective).
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uct is considered dangerous.5 0 Many courts 51 and commentators5 2
have criticized this minority view because of its total disregard for
53
the law of sales, as provided in the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Vaughn court made it clear that it would not allow recovery in
tort for losses resulting from a defective product which merely
wears out or does not meet the expectations of the parties.5 4 The
court termed such damages "economic losses"5 5 and limited their
recovery to contract law and the sales provisions of the Uniform
56
Commercial Code.
This view seems most appropriate considering the commercial
sales setting. To allow a tort recovery for economic losses would be
unfair to a seller or manufacturer, especially where the parties have
negotiated a limitation on liability 57 or an "as is"' 58 sale. 59 Because
50. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51. Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312
(D. Md. 1983) (recovery in tort denied for defective copy machines); A. C. Hoyle
Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 128 Mich. App. 577, 340 N.W.2d 326 (1983) (recovery
in tort denied for nonconforming hydraulic motors); Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) (recovery in tort denied for
defective hot plate press); Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471
(Mo. App. 1980) (recovery in tort denied for damage to defective automobile
which was not result of violent occurrence).
52. Keeton, Private Law-Torts, 25 S.W. L.J. 1 (1971) (losses resulting from
inferiority of products should be recovered in contract); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the U.C.C., 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973) (recovery for
losses should be limited to contract law where the product's defect is not dangerous to user's person or property); Comment, Strict Liability-Will it be Expanded to Allow Recovery for Commercial Loss, 16 S. TEX. L.J. 341 (1975)
(policies behind strict liability do not apply to economic loss).
53. U.C.C. §§ 2-101 - 2-725. See Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing
Physical Injury and Article 2 of the UCC, 48 Mo. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (1983). Professor Wade quoted Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
who wrote:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to
undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or the sales provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, but rather to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
Id. at 24-25 n.84 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 13, 403 P.2d, 145,
149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965)).
54. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 466 N.E.2d at 196-97.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977) (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties).
58. "[A]ll implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with
all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty ..
" Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
59. See Gocker & Yesawich, Recovery of Economic Loss Based Upon Strict
ProductsLiability, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 519, 521-22 (1982). See generally Franklin,
When Worlds Collide:Liability Theories and Disclaimersin Defective Product
Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966) (exploration of the ramifications resulting
from the convergence of tort and contract law).
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the doctrine of strict liability does not allow a seller or a manufacturer to limit its liability through disclaimers, 60 the seller or manufacturer would be liable for the product's performance even though
it did not agree that the product would meet the buyer's expectations.6 1 Therefore, permitting a tort recovery for damages incurred
from a product which simply fails to meet the party's expectations
would have the effect of superseding the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,62 and thus would make the manufacturer
63
an insurer of its products.
In Vaughn the truck did not merely fail to meet Vaughn's expectations and cause him to lose the benefit of his bargain. It is
reasonable for a consumer to expect to repair or replace brakes or
other mechanical parts after a period of use. It is unreasonable,
however, to expect that a product's defect will result in the product's total destruction and cause the user to incur additional economic losses.64 The vehicle was not only unfit for its intended
60. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties. . . . The consumer's cause of action . . . is not affected by any
disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his
immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the
consumer's hands.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965). See also Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1965);
Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 647 P.2d 334 (Mont. 1982). In
Thompson, the following clause, inserted in a contract for the purchase of a
mobile home, was found to be inoperable under a strict liability theory:
It is mutually agreed that the buyer takes the new mobile home, trailer or
other described unit, 'as is' and that there are no warranties, either express
or implied, made by the dealer. The seller specifically makes no warranty
as to its merchantability or of its fitness for any purpose.
Id. at 334-35.
61. See Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d
280, 289 (3d Cir. 1980); Gocker & Yesawich, supra note 59, at 521-22. See also
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965),
where Justice Traynor stated that a manufacturer should not be "held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees
that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands." Id. at 18, 403
P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See generally Bland & Wattson, supra note 33, at
7 (discussion of Seely's rejection of tort recovery for qualitative defects).
62. Gocker & Yesawich, supra note 59, at 521. See also Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 1980) (strict liability for economic loss would supersede § 2-316 of the U.C.C.); Morrow v. New
Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 (Alaska 1976) (tort recovery not allowed for defective mobile home).
63. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280,
289 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See O'Brien, Re. Tort Recovery Absent PersonalInjury-A "Concurring
Rebuttal," 68 ILL. B.J. 368 (1980), where the author stated:
It is one thing to charge the manufacturer with the expectation of the new
car purchaser, that the car will last for 'x' miles; travel at 'x' miles an hour;
or dependably start in 'x' weather. It is entirely another thing to charge the
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purpose, but it was a dangerously, defective product which exposed
Vaughn to an unreasonable risk of physical and financial harm. 65
Therefore, the court was justified in classifying the damages as
property damage, rather than economic losses, and allowing a recovery in tort.
In determining whether Vaughn's losses were property damage
or economic losses, the court primarily focused on how the damage

to the truck occurred. 66 The court's requirement that a loss result
from a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence 67 is as arbitrary a line
of distinction between economic loss and property damage as is a

distinction based on the type of property damage. 68 In effect, what
the court held is that only those plaintiffs fortunate enough to have
incurred losses through a dramatic event may recover in tort. Yet,
there is no justifiable reason for a court to allow or disallow a plaintiff recovery in tort based on the manner in which his losses
69
occurred.
It is not difficult to demonstrate how making a distinction between economic loss and property damage on such a basis leads to
unjustifiable results. For example, it would be unjust to allow recovery in tort to one plaintiff for the loss of contents in a defective
manufacturer with the new car purchaser's expectation that the auto, while
maybe not being mechanically indestructible, is at least not going to self-

destruct as a result of a defect. The distinction is that in one case the product simply 'wears out' from use or overuse; in the other case it is damaged
or destroyed as a result of its own defective manufacture.
Id. at 368.
65. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165 (3d Cir. 1981). "The law does not require purchasers to bargain for a safe
product, because the manufacturer has a legally imposed duty to provide such
an item." Id. at 1175.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
67. Vaughn, 102 Ill. 2d at 436 466 N.E.2d at 197.
68. See infra notes 69, 72, 74, 77-78.
69. Justice Peters stated:
I cannot rationally hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an
accident caused by a defective part may recover his property damage under
a given theory while another plaintiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for
other damages proximately caused by an identical defective part. The strict
liability rule should apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be
validly distinguished.
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 22 n.2, 403 P.2d 145, 154 n.2, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 26 n.2 (1965) (Peters, J., dissenting and concurring). Chief Justice Traynor
stated in the majority opinion of Seely, that "[t]he distinction that the law has
drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in
having an accident causing physical injury." Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 23. See also Fallon, supra note 47, at 501 (author questions whether a
plaintiff forced to repair or replace a dangerously defective product needs to
suffer "sudden and calamitous damage" to recover in tort).
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tank that ruptured,70 and to deny recovery to another because the
loss resulted from a leak through a crack in the tank.71 Both plaintiffs suffered the same harm from a defective product that was unreasonably dangerous to his property. Therefore, both plaintiffs
72
should be afforded the same avenues of recovery.
Some jurisdictions, which previously adopted the "sudden and
calamitous" requirement for the distinction between economic loss
74
and property damage, 73 have since questioned its applicability.
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently allowed a plaintiff recovery
in strict products liability against an insulation manufacturer for
economic damages sustained to the plaintiff's building that resulted
from the insulation's emission of dangerous toxic fumes.7 5 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that Alaska's prior strict
liability decisions required a "sudden and calamitous" occurrence
test 76 and stated that there was nothing "magical" about the phrase
"sudden and calamitous. '7 7 The court reasoned that damages re70. See supra note 41.
71. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 69. See also Ribstein, Guidelinesfor Deciding Product
Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493 (1978), where the writer rejected
the "sudden and calamitous occurrence" test of tort recovery and stated:
The Courts have been willing to permit tort recovery where the damage
occurs in a sudden 'accident' because of the close analogy to the standard
property damage case; but there is no significant difference between cases
arguably involving an 'accident,' such as the collapse of a tobacco barn due
to bad design, and gradual deterioration of the product due to defect, or
simple unsuitability. In all of these cases the claim is that the product was
defective when it was sold, and it should not matter whether the defect
manifested itself dramatically or remained quietly latent in the product.
Id. at 498-99.
73. Gene Cantrell Drilling Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 571 F. Supp. 1216
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (defendant denied judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff
alleged an explosion of a defective oil rig caused damages through a "violent
occurrence"); City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp.
1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (plaintiff denied recovery in negligence and strict liability
for merely defective fire truck); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska,
1977) (damage to mobile home as a result of a fire was deemed property damage
and recoverable in tort); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306
S.E.2d 253 (1983) (tort recovery allowed where damage results from an accident); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39
(1983) (recovery in tort allowed where damage results from a sudden, violent
event); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 859 (W. Va.
1982) (strict liability recovery where defective product causes damages through
a "sudden calamitous event").
74. Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983). See also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1171 n.19 (3d
Cir. 1981), where the court admitted that "[w]ith some products an accident
may not be clearly distinguishable from internal deterioration."
75. Shooshanian, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).
76. See Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
77. "A 'sudden and calamitous' event has never been the test of what constitutes 'property damage.'. . . In light of our opinion today, we think the
phrase has limited future utility." Shooshanian, 672 P.2d 455, 464 (Alaska 1983)

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:525

sulting from a "sudden and calamitous" event may demonstrate the
dangerousness of the defective product; however, the distinction between economic loss and property damage should not rest on a test
78
of how the damage occurred.
It is proposed that future courts' analyses of this issue focus on
whether the product was defective when it left the hands of the
manufacturer and whether the defect was unreasonably dangerous
to the user's person or property. 79 If both conditions exist, then the
damage resulting from the defect should be deemed property damage and recoverable in tort.80 If, however, the defective product
was not unreasonably dangerous to the user's person or property,
but merely failed to meet the buyer's expectations, then the resulting damages should be deemed economic loss and should not be recoverable in tort. 8 ' The plaintiff must then resort to his contract or
the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code for recovery.8 2 If the Illinois Supreme Court had applied this analysis to the
Vaughn case, it would have retained the tort and contract law distinction, while still finding that Vaughn's losses were recoverable in
tort.
The decision in Vaughn left intact Illinois' long standing bar
against recovery in tort for economic losses. It broadened, however,
the definition of "property damage" to include damage to the defective product itself. In its attempt to separate contract law from tort
law, the court drew an arbitrary line of distinction between economic loss and property damage. As a result of this decision, future
courts deciding whether a plaintiff's losses are economic or property damage will be forced to examine how the losses occurred. An
analysis of this nature must be abandoned due to potential unjustifi(quoting Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324,
328, n.5 (Alaska 1981)). See also Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 447, 666 P.2d 544, 548 (1983) (rejection of the "sudden and
calamitous" occurrence test as the exclusive factor determining whether the
loss is recoverable in tort).
78. See Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324, 328 (Alaska 1981). The court stated that its "purpose in using that phrase
was merely to illustrate those instances in which 'property damage' is most
" Id.
likely to be found ..
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See supra note 1.

80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 8, 9, 51-63 and accompanying text. See also Gocker &
Yesawich, supra note 59, at 522, where the commentator, realizing that in some
instances there is a disparity of bargaining power between the parties, noted
that U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (Unconscionable Contract or Clause), gives the courts
the power to refuse to enforce a contract that it finds as a matter of law to be
unconscionable. Id. at 522 n.17. Therefore, the "courts need not resort to a
strict products liability claim to protect the interest of a consumer bound by an
onerous contract term which arose from a disparity in the bargaining power of
the parties." Id.

1985]

539

Vaughn v. General Motors Corp.

able results and the fact that it allows manufacturers to escape liability for their unreasonably dangerous products. Regardless of
whether the losses occur through a dramatic event, a plaintiff
should be allowed a tort recovery if his losses result from a product's defect which was unreasonably dangerous to his person or
property.
Joyce A. Zizzo

